The client was growing, mainly through expansion in Southern Europe, and had decided to handle that growth from the existing distribution centre. That was not possible without intervention. Replacing the existing mechanisation was an investment of millions without a single cubic metre of extra capacity, and even with a night shift and overtime the DC would eventually no longer be able to cope with the volumes.
At the same time, the board wanted to increase availability in the stores, which required considerably greater accuracy per allocation. More volume, more variation, less space — and an operation made up of separate sub-processes, each with its own system and its own version of the truth about stock, capacity and planning.
Buying technology was not the problem: several suppliers could deliver what was needed. The problem lay in three constraints that stacked on top of each other and that no supplier could solve.
The mechanisation had to stay within the existing building — the wish of both the owner and the management itself. The building was too low for the chosen technology, so one hall had to be raised considerably: roof off, floor reinforced, installations moved.
The operation had to keep delivering in the meantime — not only during construction, but also during the transition. Two operations in one building, at the same time.
And warehouse management had to be separated from the existing system landscape. The new WMS had to connect to an outdated environment that could not do everything that was needed. That constraint would come back later.
The WMS go-live took one weekend and caused no disruption to store deliveries. The mechanisation took more effort, but was running fully at handover in the spring of 2024.
According to the client, the business case has now been achieved. There was a period in between, and it is worth mentioning — because it shows where programmes like this really get stuck.
At handover, part of the volume was still handled manually, for two reasons that both lay outside the technology.
Both were taken up by the organisation itself, and both were solved by the organisation itself — with the result the business case had predicted all along: fewer people on the floor and a higher fill rate per roll cage.
For us, that is the strongest part of this case. Not that the system started running, but that the company took the last two steps itself.
The financial figures come from the client’s business case (base case, 2022) and are estimates made beforehand, not realised outcomes. The comparison is always with the variant without mechanisation. The annual benefit stated is the difference in operating costs in the last year of the business case and consists mainly of lower staffing and lower transport costs.
At the formal handover, most of the volume ran through the mechanised system; the rest was still processed by hand. Shuttle utilisation and performance against the plan standard are separate measures with their own outcomes and are not used here.
At the moment of handover, the system was running but the business case had not yet been achieved. Closing that gap was the work of the organisation itself, after our involvement. That the business case has now been achieved is a statement by the client; we did not measure that result ourselves.
What remained when we left:
None of these five is technology. All five are the reason the technology kept working.
But the real proof is what happened after us. We left with a running system and two tasks that had been named and understood: the boxes, and the legacy of the old system landscape. Not a vague remainder, but two concrete tasks with a known cause and a known effect on the business case. The organisation solved them itself.
That is ultimately the sharpest test of a transformation: not whether the consultant stays long enough, but whether the company finishes the job without them.